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Abstract
Sovereign debt is not sustainable even in the presence of uninsurable risks; which extends the result of Bulow
and Rogoff (1989). But the argument is not as general. Indeed, examples show that positive borrowing may be
enforced even though the sovereign’s natural debt limits, corresponding to the most pessimistic evaluation of future
endowment, are finite. Unsustainable sovereign debt in incomplete asset markets requires a strong version of high
implied interest rates: the value of the most optimistic evaluation of future endowment is finite
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1. INTRODUCTION
The impossibility result of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) asserts that sovereign debt is unsustainable if
debt contracts are not supported by direct sanctions and default carries only a ban from ever borrowing
in financial markets.1 The intuition is that, when solvency constraints preclude the roll-over of debt, a
country can always improve upon contractual arrangements that involve repayments (i.e., positive net
transfers from the country to foreign investors) by defaulting at the date-event associated with the max-
imum expansion of debt. When markets are complete, debt unsustainability obtains as long as effective
debt limits are as tight as, or tighter than, the natural debt limits (that is, dominated by a finite present
We would like to thank Alessandro Citanna, Martin Kaae Jensen and Filipe Martins-da-Rocha for comments and sug-
gestions. Gaetano Bloise acknowledges the financial support of the Italian Ministry of Education (PRIN 2010-2012). Yiannis
Vailakis acknowledges the financial support of an ERC starting grant (FP7, Ideas specific program, Project 240983 DCFM) and
of an ANR research grant (Project Novo Tempus). Yiannis Vailakis acknowledges the hospitality of Kobe University (RIBE)
and Universite´ de Dauphine at early stages of the project.
1Bulow and Rogoff (1989) led to a vast literature studying alternative mechanisms enforcing debt repayment in the absence
of sanctions. We refer to Aguiar and Amador (2014) and Wright (2011) for a thorough discussion of the literature.
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value of the sovereign’s future endowment), for otherwise debt could be rolled-over indefinitely and
default would not be profitable.2
The logic underlying the unsustainability of sovereign debt is deeper than intuition suggests, and,
as a matter of fact, its proof is subtle.3 Even though solvency constraints impose debt redemption,
repayments might be extremely dispersed over time under uncertainty. During the repayment phase,
trade in financial instruments is still necessary for protection against adverse shocks, and a temporary
expansion of liabilities might be indispensable for consumption smoothing purposes. For default to
be profitable because of saved repayments, financial markets must allow for a similar risk diversification
when borrowing is prohibited. Under incomplete markets, it is not clear that such a replication is feasible.
This casts doubts on the relevance of the result in Bulow and Rogoff (1989).
We provide examples of sovereign debt sustained by reputation under incomplete markets when nat-
ural debt limits are finite. Incentives for debt repayment are stronger, because, as liabilities are not al-
lowed after default, some insurance opportunities cannot be replicated. Default involves a benefit (saved
repayments) along with a cost (incomplete risk-diversification). The incentive to default depends on this
trade-off and, for high risk-aversion, the cost may overcome the benefit. This suggests that, in order to
restore the validity of the impossibility result, we need to identify conditions that allow for replication
under incomplete asset markets.
When asset markets are incomplete, the evaluation of non-tradable claims is ambiguous (Santos and
Woodford (1997)). At a competitive equilibrium, under full commitment, debt is restricted by feasible
repayment, the natural debt limit, corresponding to the most pessimistic evaluation of future endowment.
Our examples reveal that impossibility may fail even though natural debt limits are finite, a legitimate
analog of high implied interest rates for incomplete markets. We argue that, in general, replication
requires that the most optimistic evaluation of future endowment be also finite, a substantially more
demanding condition. And this is because it guarantees the existence of a trading strategy that finances
any budget-affordable net consumption plan through portfolios that involve no liabilities. We show
that, under an additional mild technical assumption (related to the continuity of the underlying pricing
functional), this is sufficient to restore the validity of the impossibility result unless the sovereign can run
a Ponzi game.
2Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) (also Bidian and Bejan (2014)) show that low implied interest rates is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the exact roll-overing of equilibrium self-enforcing debt limits.
3Martins-da-Rocha and Vailakis (2014) show that the original argument of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) does not go through
when the output of the sovereign may vanish along a path of successive low productivity shocks or when it may grow unbound-
edly along a path of successive high productivity shocks.
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Pesendorfer (1992) studies repayment incentives of small open economies trading with competitive
risk-neutral foreign investors while having access to a limited set of financial assets. His analysis differs
from ours in a crucial aspect. The punishment in Pesendorfer (1992) is that defaulters may not hold a
negative position in any of the available assets. As long as debtors cannot form portfolios consistent
with full insurance, such a punishment for default may support for positive borrowing. We instead
do allow defaulters to sell assets short, but only insofar as their portfolio does not involve negative
payoffs (future net obligations or net liabilities). In some circumstances, these two formulations are
equivalent: under complete markets, when a full set of elementary Arrow securities is available and,
under incomplete markets, when only a risk-free bond is traded. In general, our no liability constraint is
a weaker punishment when all securities yield positive payoffs and, thus, default is more likely.
It is worth noticing that, following Pesendorfer (1992), one can construct examples in which a ban
on short sales supports positive borrowing even if there is a complete set of assets. In fact, in order to
establish Bulow and Rogoff (1989)’s claim of unsustainable sovereign debt, it is in general necessary
that all positive contingent claims remain available to a defaulting country, because short sales might be
essential to replicate insurance opportunities after default. In this sense, we extend Bulow and Rogoff
(1989) to incomplete markets under comparable conditions.
Evidently, the no short sale constraint can be implemented without observing trades in other securi-
ties of a defaulting country. However, this is also true for the no liability constraint when all redundant
securities are traded in the market. Thus, ultimately, the separating hypothesis is whether redundant
securities can be issued. Permitting such trades upon default seems, besides necessary for their claim,
more in the spirit of Bulow and Rogoff (1989)’s cash-in-advance contract (an up-front payment in ex-
change of positive contingent deliveries in the future). Market access is preserved after default to the
extent that the other parties are not exposed to the insolvency of the country. Moreover, the no liability
constraint seems also consistent with competitive markets, as the creation of redundant securities does
not raise any pricing issue. We can imagine this process of (redundant) financial innovation as a sort of
competition among intermediaries providing packaged securities at their market price (with the addition
of a negligible fee).
Our paper is also related to the recent work of Auclert and Rognlie (2015). They obtain an incom-
plete markets Bulow-Rogoff counterpart under Markovian uncertainty when a risk-free bond is the only
available asset. Under risk-neutral pricing, when the interest rate is constant, it is easy to exhibit a simple
replication strategy. However, these restrictive assumptions on pricing do not allow for drawing general
implications about debt sustainability at a competitive equilibrium.
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The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we present the intuition for our analysis. In section
3, we lay out the fundamentals of the economy. In section 4, we discuss the meaning of, and the link
between, various restrictions on the asset pricing kernel. In section 5, we present examples that bring out
the insight underlying the failure of Bulow and Rogoff (1989)’s unsustainable debt result in incomplete
markets. In section 6, we show which conditions on arbitrage-free prices restore the validity of the
impossibility result of Bulow and Rogoff (1989). It is worth noticing that we introduce a different
approach that applies independently of the extension to incomplete markets. For completeness, we gather
some technical properties of incomplete-markets pricing in Appendices A and B.
2. INTUITION
We develop the intuition for unsustainable sovereign debt in a simple deterministic economy. Our
approach is different from the original argument in Bulow and Rogoff (1989). This alternative method
brings out the logic that underlies the incentives to default in a way that can then be immediately extended
to uncertainty even under incomplete markets.
Time, t, is discrete, and the initial date is t = 0. The sovereign is entitled to an endowment e =
(. . . , et, . . .) > 0, and consumes c = (. . . , ct, . . .) > 0. The flow budget constraint requires that
pt+1vt+1 + pt (ct − et) ≤ ptvt,
where p = (. . . , pt, . . .) > 0 is a process for present value prices and v = (. . . , vt, . . .) is the evolution
of sovereign wealth. Prices are obtained by compounding interest rates over time or, equivalently, their
ratios are determined by interest rates; vt is a claim if positive and a liability if negative. Both prices and
the endowment might be highly non-stationary processes; if not, the analysis is straightforward.
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) assume that sovereign debt never exceeds the market value of a claim on
the country’s future income stream, that is,
−gt = − 1
pt
∑
r≥0
pt+ret+r ≤ vt.
Clearly, this is restrictive only if the claim has finite value or, according to the terminology of Alvarez
and Jermann (2000), only if the hypothesis of high implied interest rates is satisfied. Bulow and Rogoff
(1989) argue that, when the plan involves liabilities over time, the country will have an incentive to
default and to revert to cash-in-advance contracts. These are budget-balanced plans involving no debt
over time, that is, in this simple deterministic economy, budget-balanced plans fulfilling an additional no
borrowing constraint. In this sense, reputational debt is unsustainable.
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In general, a default incentive for the sovereign balances a benefit (no repayments according to the
previous debt obligations) with a cost (reduced trade opportunities, due to the subsequent no borrowing
constraint). The intuition of Bulow and Rogoff (1989)’s paradox is instead grounded on a pure arbitrage
principle: the sovereign is able to replicate the previous consumption plan without borrowing and, hence,
incurs no substantial cost upon default. The key step is the construction of this replication policy.
Define b = (. . . , bt, . . .) as the process satisfying, at every t,
bt = sup
r≥0
1
pt
pt+r (−vt+r) .
In economic terms, bt is the minimum amount of resources that enables the sovereign to extinguish the
debt in any arbitrary date beginning from t. This value is finite since debt is bounded by the present value
of the country’s income stream. In particular, −vt ≤ bt ≤ gt.
It is immediate to verify that the process b is deflating, since the cost of solvency cannot increase over
time in present value. Thus,
pt+1bt+1 ≤ ptbt.
This crucial observation reveals that replication is feasible. Indeed, the alternative financial plan w =
v + b ≥ 0 satisfies the budget constraint with no liabilities, that is,
pt+1 (vt+1 + bt+1) + pt (ct − et) ≤ pt (vt + bt) .
In other terms, at every point in time, bt is the minimum amount of resources that would allow the
sovereign to dispense with liabilities at no cost in terms of future trade opportunities. Furthermore, if the
inequality is slack,
pt+1bt+1 < ptbt,
then wt = vt + bt = 0, which uncovers a strict benefit from defaulting (and restarting with wt = 0).
In the spirit of Bulow and Rogoff (1989), in this situation, sovereign debt has reached its maximum
expansion and, thus, the country begins a repayment policy. Defaulting allows the country to save on
these repayments and enjoy higher consumption.
For default not to be profitable, the adapted process b must be rolling-over exactly, that is,
pt+1bt+1 = ptbt,
which implies that sovereign debt is not deflating over time and, therefore, a repayment policy never
begins. No default incentive emerges, but this contradicts the assumption that debt is bounded by the
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present value of the future income stream, because, in this case,
0 < p0b0 ≤ lim
t→∞ ptbt ≤ limt→∞ ptgt ≤ 0.
Notice that, under high implied interest rates, when debt exceeds the present value of future income, the
sovereign is necessarily running a Ponzi game, as it is rolling over the portion of its liabilities exceeding
the value of its endowment.
We develop this line of reasoning in order to provide a proof under incomplete markets. An analo-
gously constructed process reveals the cost for extinguishing the debt under uncertainty at any contingent
truncation. The fact that truncations are contingent is an essential step in the argument, for otherwise the
process would not be deflating and would not be suitable for replication. When markets are incomplete,
the adapted process might not be in the space of tradable claims. Here we exploit the basic principles for
the transfer of resources under incomplete markets. The current cost of meeting a future debt obligation,
using available securities, can be computed as its largest evaluation at state prices consistent with no
arbitrage opportunities. Thus, the largest evaluation of future liabilities identifies a plan that eliminates
the debt at the predefined contingent truncation, which allows us to extend the argument for default to
incomplete markets.
3. FUNDAMENTALS
3.1. Uncertainty. Trading occurs at each date-event in the set S along an infinite horizon. Time is
indexed by t in T = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. We use the common notation st to denote one of the date-events in
S that may be reached in period t in T. Date-events in S are endowed with a partial ordering , that
is, whenever date-event st+r (st−r) in S succeeds (precedes) date-event st in S , we write st+r  st
(st  st−r). Thus, {st+1 ∈ S : st+1  st} is the finite set of immediate successors of date-event st in
S , whereas {st ∈ S : st+1  st} is the unique predecessor of date-event st+1 in S . There is a unique
initial date-event s0 in S. The set S, endowed with the partial order , is the event-tree.
The continuation tree at date-event st in S is S (st) = {st+r ∈ S : st+r  st}. A finite contingent
truncation F (st) of the continuation tree S (st) is a finite set of -unordered elements in S (st) such
that any date-event in S (st) admits either a (weak) successor or a (weak) predecessor inF (st). Figure 1
presents an example of a contingent truncation in a simple binomial tree: the continuation tree is initiated
at the date-event corresponding to the first solid circle, while a contingent truncation is identified by the
thick circles.
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FIGURE 1. Finite contingent truncation
3.2. Basic notation. Denote by L the linear space of all maps x : S → R. A map x in L is positive,
x ≥ 0, when x (st) ≥ 0 for every date-event st in S; non-trivially positive, x > 0, when positive and
x
(
st
)
> 0 for some date-event st in S; strictly positive, x 0, when x (st) > 0 for every date-event st
in S. The positive cone is L+ = {x ∈ L : x ≥ 0}. For an element x on L, (x (st))
st∈D is also regarded
as an element of the linear space L for any subset D of S, that is, as an element of L vanishing out of the
subset D of S.
3.3. Consumption and preferences. We let e be the element of L+ representing the sovereign’s en-
dowment process of the single commodity, where e
(
st
)
in R+ is the available value at date-event st in
S . The sovereign’s preferences on consumption plans c in L+ are defined by a contingent utility function
U : L+ → L, where U (c) (st) is the utility value beginning from date-event st in S. It is assumed that
U (cˆ)
(
st
)
> U (c˜)
(
st
)
whenever
(
cˆ
(
st+r
))
st+r∈S(st) >
(
c˜
(
st+r
))
st+r∈S(st). Strict monotonicity is
the only restriction on preferences.
3.4. Markets. To simplify notation, at no loss of generality, incomplete markets are represented by a
linear subspace V of L such that v is in V if and only if
(
v
(
st+1
))
st+1st is also in V for every s
t in S.
In other terms, the space of tradable claims decomposes sequentially in a collection of components for
every date-event, each with deliveries only at subsequent date-events. For a tradable claim v in V , we
use the canonical decomposition v = v+ − v−, separating claims v+ in L+ from liabilities v− in L+.
These are interpreted as net positions, since the portfolio composition is not explicit. We maintain the
assumption that some strictly positive element u on L is also in V , that is, available financial instruments
allow for a (possibly risky) strictly positive transfer. The presence of a risk-free bond would be sufficient
to ensure this, though it is more demanding than necessary.
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For concreteness, as an example, consider the case where a finite set J of short-lived (one-period)
securities is traded at every date-event st in S. Each security j in J is represented as a return process
yj in L, interpreted as promises to deliver at successor nodes. A portfolio z in LJ specifies holdings of
available securities at all contingencies, with zj
(
st
)
in R being the holding of security j in J at date-
event st in S. In this case, the space of tradable contingent claims V consists of all v in L such that, for
some portfolio process z in LJ , at every date-event st in S,
v
(
st+1
)
=
∑
j∈J
zj
(
st
)
yj
(
st+1
)
,
where it is understood that st+1 in S is the successor of st in S.
To maintain the analogy with complete markets, the market pricing of securities is represented as an
element ϕ on V . This is at no loss of generality, as we assume that the Law of One Price is satisfied (see
Ch. 2 and Ch. 17 in LeRoy and Werner (2001)). Thus, at every date-event st in S, the market value of
any portfolio with deliveries
(
v
(
st+1
))
st+1st in V is given by∑
st+1st
ϕ
(
st+1
)
v
(
st+1
)
.
No arbitrage implies that, whenever
(
v
(
st+1
))
st+1st in V is a (non-trivial) positive claim, then its
market value must be strictly positive. In other terms, any (non-trivially) positive claim is costly on the
market.
A price p in P is a strictly positive element of L satisfying, for every tradable claim v in V , at every
date-event st in S, ∑
st+1st
ϕ
(
st+1
)
v
(
st+1
)
=
1
p (st)
∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
v
(
st+1
)
.
By the assumption of no arbitrage, implicit prices exist and form a (non-empty) convex cone P . Observe
that only the ratios are relevant for the determination of such implicit prices. This provides an equivalent
representation of the asset pricing kernel. Indeed, as prices are invariant on the space of tradable claims
V , at every date-event st in S , the market value of claims v in V is given by
inf
p∈P
1
p (st)
∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
v
(
st+1
)
= sup
p∈P
1
p (st)
∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
v
(
st+1
)
.
Here we take these basic facts as a primitive framework. They are well-established results in the literature
and need no justification (see, for instance, Magill and Quinzii (1996), Santos and Woodford (1997) and
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LeRoy and Werner (2001)). To make the paper self-contained, the relevant theorems are collected in
Appendix A.
3.5. Ponzi games. A country is running a Ponzi scheme, or game, whenever it is persistently financing
liabilities by means of other liabilities. Precisely, a financial plan v in V involves a Ponzi scheme if there
exists a process b in V , with non-trivial part b+ in L+, such that, at every date-event st in S,
(PG-1) b
(
st
) ≤ v− (st) ,
and
(PG-2) b
(
st
) ≤ ∑
st+1st
ϕ
(
st+1
)
b
(
st+1
)
.
These conditions capture the fact that some outstanding liabilities are served by new liabilities perpetually
and, thus, are rolled over indefinitely. Notice that, because of incomplete markets, assuming that b− in
L+ is zero would be unnecessarily restrictive. For later use, we provide an operational reformulation
based on the dual representation of incomplete markets.
Lemma 3.1 (Ponzi schemes). A financial plan v in V involves a Ponzi scheme if and only if there exists
a non-trivial process b∗ in L+ such that, at every date-event st in S,
b∗
(
st
) ≤ v− (st)
and
b∗
(
st
) ≤ inf
p∈P
1
p (st)
∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
b∗
(
st+1
)
.
Proof. Assuming that conditions (PG-1)-(PG-2) are satisfied, define b∗ = b+ in L+. When b+
(
st
)
= 0
at a date-event st in S, the claim is true. In the other case, (PG-2) implies, for every price p in P ,
b+
(
st
) ≤ 1
p (st)
∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
b
(
st+1
) ≤ 1
p (st)
∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
b+
(
st+1
)
,
so proving necessity. For sufficiency, by the Theorem of Duality (see Appendix A), there exists a tradable
plan b in V such that, at every date-event st in S ,
b
(
st
) ≤ b∗ (st)
and ∑
st+1st
ϕ
(
st+1
)
b
(
st+1
)
= inf
p∈P
1
p (st)
∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
b∗
(
st+1
)
.
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It is simple to verify that conditions (PG-1)-(PG-2) are satisfied. 
3.6. Self-enforcing contracts. A contract c in L+ is sustained by a financial plan v in V if, at every
date-event st in S, ∑
st+1st
ϕ
(
st+1
)
v
(
st+1
)
+
(
c
(
st
)− e (st)) = v (st) .
Notice that budget exhaustion is unrestrictive because of the existence of a strictly positive tradable
claim u in V . Obviously, without any solvency requirement, the budget constraint is vacuous when
Ponzi games are not ruled out. Thus, remaining agnostic on the nature of debt limits, we only say that
a contract c in L+ is budget-feasible if it is sustained by a financial plan v in V which does not involve
any Ponzi scheme. Budget restrictions are compatible with liabilities, though debt cannot be rolled over
indefinitely.
The sovereign can default at any date-event. Upon default financial instruments remain available
subject to a no liability restriction. Thus, after default, financial plans w are restricted to V ∩ L+. A
budget-feasible contract c in L+ is immune to default if, at every date-event st in S, for every alterna-
tive contract cˆ in L+ which is sustained by a restricted financial plan w in V ∩ L+ with w (st) = 0,
U (c)
(
st
) ≥ U (cˆ) (st). In other terms, a contract is immune to default whenever, at every date-event, a
country would not benefit from defaulting and trading subject to the no liability restriction thereafter.
3.7. Replication. For the understanding of default incentives, it is important to identify the role of lia-
bilities in providing insurance opportunities. To this purpose, we say that a contract c in L+ is replicable
whenever it is sustained by a financial plan w in V ∩ L+. When not all contracts are replicable, default
involves the implicit cost of restricting insurance opportunities.
We preliminarily observe that, when a contract can be replicated, it is sustainable by conducting pre-
viously planned trades in securities along with a rolling-over policy. When the risk-free bond is available
in the market, the rolling-over component can consist of this only security, provided that the interest rate
is uniformly positive and the endowment process is bounded. Otherwise, the risk-free bond might be
unsuitable to replicate insurance opportunities. We provide below an example to support this claim (see
Example 5.3). In general, under incomplete markets, the portfolio for the rolling-over component can
only be identified abstractly.
Proposition 3.1 (Rolling-over). A contract c in L+, sustained by a financial plan v in V , is replicable if
and only if there is a process b∗ in V such that, at every date-event st in S,
v
(
st
)
+ b∗
(
st
) ≥ 0,
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and
b∗
(
st
)
=
∑
st+1st
ϕ
(
st+1
)
b∗
(
st+1
)
.
Proof. Notice that w = v + b∗ is a financial plan in V ∩ L+. The proof is obvious because the budget is
unaffected when the rolling over condition is satisfied. 
We here provide a more fundamental necessary condition for replication. Replication requires a finite
present value of future debt at any finite contingent truncation. In other terms, according to the interpre-
tation in §2, the cost of solvency is finite at every date-event. As we shall prove later on (Proposition
6.1), this condition is also sufficient for replication.
Proposition 3.2 (Necessary condition for replication). A contract c in L+, sustained by a financial plan
v in V , is replicable only if, at every date-event st in S,
b
(
st
)
= sup
p∈P
sup
F(st)⊂S(st)
1
p (st)
∑
st+r∈F(st)
p
(
st+r
) (−v (st+r)) is finite,
where F (st) is any finite contingent truncation of S (st).
Proof. Fix any p in P and notice that, by Proposition 3.1,
1
p (st)
∑
st+r∈F(st)
p
(
st+r
) (−v (st+r)) ≤ 1
p (st)
∑
st+r∈F(st)
p
(
st+r
)
b∗
(
st+r
)
≤ b∗ (st) ,
where F (st) is any finite contingent truncation of S (st). This is sufficient to establish the claim. 
4. HIGH INTEREST RATES
Under full commitment, liabilities are traditionally bounded by natural debt limits. This is justified
by the requirement that sustainable debt need be repayable in finite time out of the available endowment.
As established by Herna´ndez and Santos (1996), Levine and Zame (1996) and Santos and Woodford
(1997), when markets are incomplete, the natural debt limit is given by the worst evaluation of future
endowment. Thus, at a competitive equilibrium of this sort,
(E) inf
p∈P
1
p (s0)
∑
st∈S
p
(
st
)
e
(
st
)
is finite,
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for otherwise solvency would not be enforced. In general, this is the only restriction on state prices at
the competitive equilibrium (see Magill and Quinzii (1994) and Herna´ndez and Santos (1996) for the
existence of a competitive equilibrium under incomplete markets).
We provide examples in §5 showing that, in general, the impossibility result of Bulow and Rogoff
(1989) fails under condition (E), because insurance opportunities cannot be replicated without liabilities
after default. We need to further restrict prices by assuming that
(F) sup
p∈P
1
p (s0)
∑
st∈S
p
(
st
)
e
(
st
)
is finite.
That is, the value of the endowment is (uniformly) finite for all prices consistent with the absence of
arbitrage opportunities. In analogy with the terminology used in complete markets (see Alvarez and
Jermann (2000)), we refer to this property as high implied interest rates.
Under complete markets, high implied interest rates deliver the continuity of the pricing kernel in a
topology which is coherent with impatience: the value of residual claims in the remote future vanishes.
We need a similar property under incomplete markets, namely,
(H) lim
t→∞ supp∈P
1
p (s0)
∑
st∈St
∑
st+r∈S(st)
p
(
st+r
)
e
(
st+r
)
= 0,
where St contains all date-events in S at date t in T. When the pricing kernel satisfies condition (H), we
say that it exhibits uniformly high implied interest rates.
Remark 4.1. As the terminology suggests, condition (H) implies condition (F). Indeed, assuming that
(F) is violated, we can show that, for any  > 0, at every date t in T,
sup
p∈P
1
p (s0)
∑
st∈St
∑
st+r∈S(st)
p
(
st+r
)
e
(
st+r
) ≥ ,
thus violating restriction (H). To this purpose, it suffices to argue that, for every t in T,
sup
p∈P
1
p(s0)
∑
st−r∈S0,t
p
(
st−r
)
e
(
st−r
)
is finite,
where S0,t contains all contingencies in S from the initial date up to date t in T. This is what we
accomplish in the following, by exploiting that some strictly positive claim u is in the tradable space V .
Fixing any t in T, suppose that
(
w
(
st+1
))
st+1∈St+1 is a tradable claim in V ∩ L+. It is immediate
to verify that there exists a tradable claim
(
w
(
st
))
st∈St in V ∩ L+ such that, for every price p in P , at
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every date-event st in St∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
w
(
st+1
)
+ p
(
st
)
e
(
st
) ≤ p (st)w (st) .
This is true because, for some sufficiently large λ > 0, the expansion λ
(
u
(
st
))
st∈St is an arbitrarily
large strictly positive tradable claim in V ∩L+, where u is the strictly positive claim in V . Therefore, by
backward induction, beginning with
(
w
(
st+1
))
st+1∈St+1 = 0, there exists a sufficiently large w
(
s0
)
in
R+ such that, for every p in P , ∑
st−r∈S0,t
p
(
st−r
)
e
(
st−r
) ≤ p (s0)w (s0) ,
thus proving the claim.
Remark 4.2. Condition (F) does not imply condition (H) when markets are incomplete. We provide
an example in Appendix B, where we also present a complete (rather technical) characterisation of this
lack of coincidence. The failure of condition (H), when condition (F) is satisfied, only happens in rather
singular situations.
Remark 4.3. Here is an important case in which condition (H) is satisfied. Let us consider an economy
with a tradable uncontingent bond in which there exists a sufficiently large 1 > β > 0 such that, at every
date-event st in S,
β ≥ sup
p∈P
1
p (st)
∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
.
As the right-hand side is the price of the uncontingent bond (with unitary deliveries), this restriction
imposes a sort of lower bound on the interest rates uniformly across all contingencies. When this uniform
lower bound exists, the hypothesis of uniformly high implied interest rates is satisfied in an economy with
bounded endowment.4 Indeed, given any price p in P , at every t in T, it follows that
β
∑
st∈St
p
(
st
) ≥ ∑
st+1∈St+1
p
(
st+1
)
,
where St contains all date-events in S at date t in T. Therefore, at every t in T,
1
p (s0)
∑
st∈St
∑
st+r∈S(st)
p
(
st+r
)
e
(
st+r
) ≤ η βt
1− β
where η > 0 is such that e
(
st
) ≤ η for every st in S.
4This is for instance the case in the environment studied in Auclert and Rognlie (2015).
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Remark 4.4. We here present a relevant case in which high implied interest rates are violated when the
uncontingent bond is the only tradable asset. Suppose that the price of this bond is constantly equal to
1 > β > 0 and that the endowment evolves as a random walk, that is, at every date-event st in S,
e
(
st
)
=
∑
st+1st
µt+1
(
st+1|st) e (st+1) ,
where µt+1
(
st+1|st) is the probability conditional on date-event st in S. In such an environment, a
particular price p∗ in P is given by p∗
(
st
)
= βtµt
(
st
)
e
(
st
)
at every date-event st in S, because
1
p∗ (st)
∑
st+1st
p∗
(
st+1
)
= β,
where µt
(
st
)
is the unconditional probability of date-event st in S. Notice that, given any date-event st
in S, simple computations deliver
p∗
(
st
)
e
(
st
) ≤ ∑
st+1st
p∗
(
st+1
)
e
(
st+1
)
,
where we have used a mild hypothesis on the conditional variance of the endowment process, according
to which
1 ≤ β
∑
st+1st
µt+1
(
st+1|st)(e (st+1)
e (st)
)2
.
Thus, high implied interest rates are violated, as there is a price p∗ in P such that the value of the
endowment is inflating over time.
5. EXAMPLES
We here present some examples of failure of the impossibility of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) under
incomplete markets. The cause of this failure is that the incompleteness of markets does not allow for
replication when liabilities are prohibited after default. The evaluation of future endowment is finite
for some prices, i.e., condition (E) is satisfied. However, condition (F) of high implied interest rates is
violated. We also provide an example to illustrate that, under high implied interest rates, a risk-free bond
might be ineffective in replicating insurance opportunities after default, according to the rolling-over
logic of Proposition 3.1, even when financial markets are complete.
Example 5.1. The first example is simple, but it delivers the basic intuition underlying the failure of
Bulow and Rogoff (1989)’s unsustainable debt result. The economy is subject to binomial uncertainty
over states S = {l, h} occurring with equal probability. To fix ideas, also assume that preferences over
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consumption are additively separable, i.e.,
U (c)
(
s0
)
=
∑
st∈S
βtµt
(
st
)
u
(
c
(
st
))
,
where u : R+ → R is a Bernoulli function, 1 > β > 0 is the discount factor and µt
(
st
)
is the
unconditional probability of date-event st in S. Here, as well as in the other examples, the set of date-
events S consists of all partial histories of Markov states in S having strictly positive probability, given
a predefined initial Markov state in S.
Markets are incomplete. Indeed, at every date-event st in S, there is a single asset with payoffs
(yl, yh) = (1,−1) and price q
(
st
)
= 0. The endowment is (el, eh) = (0, 2). The economy begins at
state h in S with an inherited liability v
(
s0
)
= −1. Trivially, holding one unit of the security permits
complete insurance at constant consumption c
(
st
)
= 1 at every date-event st in S. However, whenever
the economy is in state h in S, the country holds a liability. We verify whether default is profitable in
such contingencies.
Upon default, liabilities are not allowed. Hence, in this simple economy, no asset can be traded and
autarchy is the only budget-feasible consumption after default. In general, defaulting may produce no
benefit, thus violating Bulow and Rogoff (1989)’s impossibility result. Indeed, a sufficient condition for
this is that the instantaneous utility function satisfies the following inequality
(1− β) (u (2)− u (1)) < β
(
u (1)− u (2) + u (0)
2
)
.
That is, the sovereign cannot benefit from defaulting if the current gain of not repaying the debt is
compensated by the loss of smoothing future consumption.
Remark 5.1. It is immediate to see that for this example condition (F) and, hence, condition (H) is vio-
lated while condition (E) is satisfied. Indeed, the present value of the endowment is infinite (respectively,
finite) for every implicit price process p∗ in P such that, at every date-event st in S, p∗ (st) = (1/2)t δt
with δ > 1 (respectively, 0 < δ < 1).
Example 5.2. The previous example does not satisfy our assumptions because markets do not permit a
strictly positive transfer. We here develop a more complicated example under this additional restriction.
Uncertainty is given by Markov states S = {l,m, h}, all occurring with the same probability. The
economy begins in state h in S.
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As in the previous example, preferences are assumed to be additively separable with a Bernoulli utility
function of the form
u (c) =
c1−(1/γ) − 1
1− (1/γ) ,
where γ > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Notice that, for any γ in the interval (0, 1/2),
this utility function is uniformly bounded from above, as
(*) u (c) ≤ −1
1− (1/γ) ≤ 1.
Furthermore, as it can be verified by direct computation, for every 1 > η > 0,
(**) lim
γ→0
u (1− η) = lim
γ→0
(1− η)1−(1/γ) − 1
1− (1/γ) = −∞.
The important implication is that any small drop in consumption induces an arbitrarily large loss in utility
when γ > 0 is sufficiently small.
At every date-event st in S, there are only two securities paying off, for some sufficiently small
1 >  > 0, (yl, ym, yh) = (1, , 0) and (yl, ym, yh) = (0, , 1). The price of each security is q =
(1/3)β(1 + ), where 1 > β > 0 is the discount factor. The endowment is (el, em, eh) = (0, 1, 2).
Notice that strictly positive holdings of both securities permit a strictly positive transfer, as long as  > 0,
thus satisfying our general assumptions.
It is easy to construct a balanced portfolio with deliveries (vl, vm, vh) = (1, 0,−1). This sustains full-
insurance with constant consumption c
(
st
)
= 1 at every date-event st in S. Furthermore, it is optimal
for all sufficiently large bounded debt limits. Does the country benefit from defaulting when holding a
liability (and, hence, at the initial date-event s0 in S when the economy is in state h in S)?
Preliminarily notice that, at every date-event st in S, by budget feasibility without liabilities, con-
sumption is bounded by a process ξ in L+ such that, at every date-event st in S,
ξ
(
st+1
) ≥ 1
q
ξ
(
st
)
+ e
(
st+1
)
,
for some sufficiently large initial value ξ
(
s0
)
in R+. Such bounds overestimate the payoffs of available
assets (because 1 >  > 0). Moreover, they hold true independently of any sufficiently small  > 0. We
assume that the following inequality is satisfied:
(***)
q

>
1
3
β

> 1.
Under this condition, we evaluate default incentives along a sequence of monotonically vanishing γ > 0.
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Suppose that there exists a sequence of consumption plans (cγ)γ>0 such that each plan is supported by
a trading strategy involving no liabilities and guarantees an overall utility after defaulting at least equal
to the overall utility from full insurance. That is, given any γ > 0, assume that
U (cγ)
(
s0
) ≥ U (c) (s0) = 0.
At no loss of generality, it can be assumed that the sequence of consumption plans converges, that is, at
every date-event st in S, c0 (st) = limγ→0 cγ (st) ≤ ξ (st). We first argue that this limit guarantees at
least the full-insurance consumption.
To verify this, assume that, at some date-event st in S, c0 (st) < 1 − η for some 1 > η > 0. By
condition (**), this implies an infinite loss, which cannot be compensated by bounded gains in other
periods, because of (*). Hence, at every date-event st in S, the consumption in the limit exceeds the
full-insurance consumption, that is, c0
(
st
) ≥ 1. We shall now argue by contradiction.
Consider a date-event st in S in which the economy is in state m in S. Suppose that the economy
remains in state m in S for r in N consecutive dates and, after this phase, enters the averse state l in S.
This happens at the date-event st+r in S. A simple computation yields
c0
(
st+r
) ≤ (1
q
)(

q
)r−1
ξ
(
st
)
.
For the computation of this bound, we use the fact, in the limit as γ > 0 vanishes, the endowment
is completely consumed in state m in S. Initial resources are rolled over so as to overestimate their
contribution to consumption when the economy enters in state l in S. For a sufficiently large r in N, by
condition (***), full-insurance consumption cannot be guaranteed.
Remark 5.2. We can verify that, for Example 5.2, condition (F) and, hence, condition (H) is violated,
while condition (E) is satisfied. Indeed, as the economy is stationary, state prices (pil, pim, pih) in RS+ are
only restricted by the two pricing equations
pih + pim = q =
1
3
β (1 + ) and pil + pim = q =
1
3
β (1 + ) .
State prices correspond to the ratios of implicit present value prices in our general analysis. For any
choice of (stationary) state prices pi in RS+, the present value of the endowment, if finite, is determined
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by the system of equations
Ql (pi) = el + pilQl (pi) + pimQm (pi) + pihQh(pi),
Qm (pi) = em + pilQl (pi) + pimQm (pi) + pihQh (pi) ,
Qh (pi) = eh + pilQl (pi) + pimQm (pi) + pihQh (pi) .
We shall now argue that the value is finite for some state prices and infinite for other state prices.
Setting pih = pil = 0, we obtain pim = (q/). For these state prices, the present value of the endow-
ment satisfies
Qm (pi) = em + pilQl (pi) + pimQm (pi) + pihQh (pi) ≥ em + q

Qm (pi) .
No positive solution exists whenever  > 0 fulfils condition (***) in Example 5.2, thus showing that
condition (F) and, hence, condition (H) is violated.
To show that condition (E) holds true, it suffices to exhibit alternative state prices pi in RS+ for which
the value of the endowment is finite. For instance, setting pih = pim = pil = (1/3)β, a positive solution
exists and is bounded by the value of receiving surely the largest endowment forever, eh/ (1− β).
Example 5.3. The purpose of this example is to clarify that, under high implied interest rates, the risk-
free bond might be unsuitable to replicate insurance opportunities after default. As this observation is
independent of incomplete markets, we consider the case in which markets are indeed complete.
Uncertainty is given by a Markov chain on states S = {l,m, h} with the following transitions: from
state l in S (respectively, state h in S), states {m,h} (respectively, {m, l}) are reached with equal prob-
ability; state m in S is absorbing; the initial state is h in S. Hence, the economy is fluctuating between
states l and h, with a probability of entering the absorbing state m. The endowment depends only on the
Markov state and it is given by (el, em, eh) = (1 − , η, 1 + ) for some 1 >  > 0 and 1 > η > 0.
Preferences are additively separable and the smooth Bernoulli utility function u : R+ → R is strictly
increasing and strictly concave with limc→0 u′ (c) =∞. Future utility is discounted at a rate 1 > β > 0.
At every date-event st in S, a risk-free bond is traded in the market. Its price depends on the current
state in S. When the economy reaches one of the transient states {l, h} ⊂ S, the price of the bond is
qf
(
st
)
=
1
2
β +
1
2
β
u′ (η)
u′ (1)
> 1.
When the economy is in the absorbing state m in S, the price is qf
(
st
)
= β. At every date-event st in
S , when the economy is in the transient state l in S (respectively, h in S), the country can additionally
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trade an elementary Arrow security, delivering a unitary payoff conditional on state h in S (respectively,
l in S) at the price q
(
st
)
= (1/2)β.
In this setting, the constant consumption c
(
st
)
= 1 is sustainable at every date-event st in S in which
the economy reaches one of the transient states {l, h} ⊂ S. This can be achieved by trading in the
elementary Arrow security only. Budget restrictions imply(
1
2
)
βzl −  = zh and
(
1
2
)
βzh +  = zl,
where zl and zh are the holdings of the elementary Arrow security, respectively, in states l and h in S.
These are solved by zl = z and zh = −z, where z = / (1 + (1/2)β). Consumption at every date-event
st in S in which the economy has reached the absorbing state m in S is given by the endowment, i.e.,
c
(
st
)
= η. This plan is optimal provided that debt is bounded by some sufficiently large constant limit.
Notice that trade in the risk-free bond cannot increase utility because its market price is determined at
marginal utilities.
Observe that the safe interest rate is negative before the economy enters the absorbing state, though
this is perfectly consistent with high implied interest rates. Indeed, the present value of the endowment
is determined by
Ql = el + pimQm + pihQh,
Qh = eh + pimQm + pilQl,
where direct computation leads to
Qm =
η
1− β
and, by complete markets, state prices are given by pih = (1/2)β (respectively, pil = (1/2)β) and
pim =
1
2
β
u′ (η)
u′ (1)
.
The above pricing equations admits a finite positive solution.
The sovereign can benefit from default by repudiating the debt and replicating the same consumption
plan by means of a translation of the holdings of the elementary Arrow security. However, replication is
not feasible by rolling-over the risk-free bond and conducting the same trades in the elementary Arrow
security as it was doing previously. Indeed, suppose that the process b∗ in V given in Proposition 3.1
only involves trades in the risk-free bond. This requires holdings of the risk-free bond zf in L+ such
that, at every date-event st in S,
b∗
(
st+1
)
= zf
(
st
)
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and
qf
(
st
)
zf
(
st
)
= b∗
(
st
)
,
where st+1 in S is an immediate successor of st in S . Because the interest rate is negative, qf (st) > 1,
as long as the economy remains in states {l, h} ⊂ S, this plan is contracting over time and, thus, it cannot
serve to balance the recurrent liability implied by the previous trades in the elementary Arrow security.
6. UNSUSTAINABLE DEBT
We here show that, under uniformly high implied interest rates, sovereign debt is unsustainable. This
extends Bulow and Rogoff (1989)’s impossibility result (see also Martins-da-Rocha and Vailakis (2014))
under more restrictive assumptions than those for complete markets. Importantly, we provide an alterna-
tive argument which applies independently of the extension of market incompleteness.
Recall that budget restrictions are compatible with liabilities, though debt cannot be rolled over indefi-
nitely. We first show that ruling out Ponzi games is equivalent to bound liabilities by the most favourable
evaluation of future endowment. Notice that, in general, this is more permissive than the bound given by
the natural debt limit, that is, the most pessimistic evaluation of future endowment (Santos and Woodford
(1997)).
Lemma 6.1 (Bounds to liabilities). Under high implied interest rates, a contract c in L+ is budget-
feasible only if it is sustained by a financial plan v in V satisfying, at every date-event st in S,
v
(
st
)
+ g
(
st
) ≥ 0,
where the adapted process g in L+ is given by
g
(
st
)
= sup
p∈P
1
p (st)
∑
st+r∈S(st)
p
(
st+r
)
e
(
st+r
)
.
Proof. By construction of the adapted process g in L+, at every date-event st in S, for every price p in
P , ∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
g
(
st+1
)
+ p
(
st
)
e
(
st
) ≤ p (st) g (st) .
Hence, adding up with the budget constraint, for every price p in P ,∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
) (
v
(
st+1
)
+ g
(
st+1
)) ≤ p (st) (v (st)+ g (st)) .
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In turn, this implies that, for every price p in P ,
p
(
st
) (
v
(
st
)
+ g
(
st
))− ≤ ∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
) (
v
(
st+1
)
+ g
(
st+1
))−
.
Finally, at every date-event st in S , (
v
(
st
)
+ g
(
st
))− ≤ v− (st) .
Therefore, as Ponzi schemes are ruled out, we conclude that v + g ≥ 0, for otherwise the conditions in
Proposition 3.1 would be satisfied by b∗ = (v + g)− in L+. 
We now restore the impossibility result under uniformly high implied interest rates. The crucial step
in the argument is the construction of a feasible replication policy after default. The necessary condition
for replication, provided in Proposition 3.2, is also sufficient. When replication is feasible, the default
option is profitable unless the sovereign’s debt is not deflating over time. The role of strengthening
condition (F) by assuming uniformity (i.e., that condition (H) be satisfied) is precisely to rule out such a
situation. In complete markets, the uniformity follows by assumption since prices are supposed to have
a sequential representation. In incomplete markets, a non-sequential price, as the limit of admissible
sequential prices, cannot be ruled out, unless some uniformity of evaluation is imposed on the pricing
kernel (see Appendix B for a thorough discussion).
Proposition 6.1 (Sovereign debt paradox). Under uniformly high implied interest rates, a budget-feasible
contract c in L+ is immune to default only if it involves no liabilities. That is, any financial plan v in V
sustaining this contract with no Ponzi schemes must be positive.
Proof. Consider a budget-feasible contract c in L+ which is sustained by a financial plan v in V (not
involving Ponzi schemes). Given a date-event st in S, define
b
(
st
)
= sup
p∈P
sup
F(st)⊂S(st)
1
p (st)
∑
st+r∈F(st)
p
(
st+r
) (−v (st+r)) ≥ −v (st) ,
where F (st) is any finite contingent truncation of S (st) (for the definition, see §3.1). Notice that, for
fixed price p in P , given any contingent truncation F (st) of S (st),
1
p (st)
∑
st+r∈F(st)
p
(
st+r
) (−v (st+r)) ≤ 1
p (st)
∑
st+r∈F(st)
p
(
st+r
)
g
(
st+r
) ≤ g (st) ,
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where we use Lemma 6.1 and the fact that the process g in L+ satisfies the weak roll-over condition∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
g
(
st+1
)
+ p
(
st
)
e
(
st
) ≤ p (st) g (st) .
Therefore, the process b in L obeys −v ≤ b ≤ g. Furthermore, the fact that truncations are contingent
implies that b in L fulfils the following property:
b(st) = max
−v(st), supp∈P 1p(st) ∑
st+1st
p(st+1)b(st+1)
 .
This happens because F (st) is a non-trivial finite contingent truncation of S (st) if and only if
F (st) = ⋃
st+1st
F (st+1) ,
where F (st+1) is a finite contingent truncation of S (st+1) for every st+1  st in S .
By the Theorem of Duality (see Appendix A), there exists a tradable claim b∗ in V such that, at every
date-event st in S,
b
(
st
) ≤ b∗ (st)
and ∑
st+1st
ϕ
(
st+1
)
b∗
(
st+1
)
= sup
p∈P
1
p(st)
∑
st+1st
p(st+1)b(st+1).
Therefore, at every date-event st in S,∑
st+1st
ϕ
(
st+1
) (
v
(
st+1
)
+ b∗
(
st+1
))
+
(
c
(
st
)− e (st)) ≤
sup
p∈P
1
p (st)
∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
) (
v
(
st+1
)
+ b
(
st+1
))
+
(
c
(
st
)− e (st)) ≤ (v (st)+ b (st))
≤ (v (st)+ b∗ (st)) .
If there is a date-event st in S such that
b
(
st
)
> sup
p∈P
1
p (st)
∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
b
(
st+1
)
,
then v
(
st
)
+ b
(
st
)
= 0. Define the process w in V ∩ L+ as w (st) = v (st) + b (st) = 0 and
w
(
st+r
)
= v
(
st+r
)
+ b∗
(
st+r
) ≥ 0 at any strict successor st+r in S (st). This sustains the given
consumption plan without exhausting the budget at the date event st in S. That is, the consumption plan
c in L+ is not immune to default, a contradiction.
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It follows that, at every date-event st in S, we must have
b
(
st
)
= sup
p∈P
1
p (st)
∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
b
(
st+1
)
.
The last condition implies that, for every arbitrary η > 0, there exists a price process p in P such that, at
every date-event st in S ,
b
(
st
) ≤ 1
p (st)
∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
b
(
st+1
)
+ ηe
(
st
)
.
Hence, recalling that b ≤ g, we get
b
(
s0
) ≤ 1
p (s0)
∑
st+1∈St+1
p
(
st+1
)
b
(
st+1
)
+ η
1
p (s0)
∑
st−r∈S0,t
p
(
st−r
)
e
(
st−r
)
≤ 1
p (s0)
∑
st+1∈St+1
p
(
st+1
)
g
(
st+1
)
+ η
1
p (s0)
∑
st−r∈S0,t
p
(
st−r
)
e
(
st−r
)
,
where St (respectively, S0,t) contains all date-events in S at date t in T (respectively, from the initial
date up to date t in T). Taking the limit, by uniformly high implied interest rates (condition (H)), this
implies that, for any arbitrary η > 0,
b
(
s0
) ≤ η 1
p (s0)
∑
st∈S
p
(
st
)
e
(
st
)
,
which shows that b
(
s0
) ≤ 0. Reproducing the argument beginning from any date-event proves that
b ≤ 0 and, as v + b ≥ 0, v ≥ 0, thus establishing the claim. 
7. CONCLUSION
We have shown, by means of examples, that market incompleteness may induce incentives for repay-
ment when liabilities are prohibited after default. A sovereign may not benefit from defaulting on its debt
and positive borrowing can be sustainable by reputation. But the Bulow and Rogoff (1989)’s impossi-
bility result does extend to economies with uninsurable risks if the pricing functional satisfies stronger
restrictions. In particular, replication is obtained under a continuity property implying that the value of
the most optimistic evaluation of future endowment eventually vanishes in the long-run.
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APPENDIX A. ARBITRAGE-FREE PRICING
We here collect some basic facts about arbitrage-free asset pricing which are used in the body of
the text. These are well-known implications of duality. We provide simple proofs for convenience,
independently of their applications in this paper.
The space of tradable claims Y is a linear subspace of some (finite-dimensional) linear space X ,
endowed with its canonical ordering. The pricing of tradable claims is given by a linear map ϕ : Y → R.
This map is arbitrage free, in the sense that, for any claim y in Y , y > 0 only if ϕ (y) > 0. We assume
that there exists a strictly positive tradable claim u in Y with ϕ (u) = 1. This needs not be the safe asset,
though a safe asset would be sufficient for this property to be satisfied. The internal product on X is
denoted by x · y.
Let Π be the convex set of positive linear functionals pi in X such that, for every y in Y ,
ϕ (y) = pi · y.
Here is the Fundamental Theorem of Finance.
Fundamental Theorem of Finance. The set Π is compact and contains a strictly positive linear func-
tional pi on X .
Proof. Notice that the convex set K = {x ∈ X+ : x · u = 1} does not interest the linear subspace Z =
{y ∈ Y : ϕ (y) = 0}. By the Strong Separation Theorem (see for instance Aliprantis and Border (1999),
Theorem 5.58), there exists a non-null pi in X such that, for every k in K and for every z in Z,
pi · k > pi · z.
As Z is a linear space, pi · z = 0 for every z in Z. If pi · x ≤ 0 for some non-null x in X+, then
0 ≥ 1
x · upi · x ≥ pi ·
(
1
x · ux
)
> 0,
a contradiction. Hence, pi is a strictly positive positive linear functional on X . We next show that pi is in
Π.
At no loss of generality, it can be assumed that pi · y¯ = ϕ (y¯) > 0 for some y¯ in Y . Given any y in Y ,
suppose that ϕ (y) > pi · y. Hence,
ϕ
(
y − ϕ (y)
ϕ (y¯)
y¯
)
= 0 and pi ·
(
y − ϕ (y)
ϕ (y¯)
y¯
)
< 0,
a contradiction. The set Π is compact as it is contained in {pi ∈ X+ : pi · u = ϕ (u)}. 
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When markets are incomplete, Π contains multiple value kernels. Nevertheless, values are restricted
by upper and lower bounds.
Theorem of Duality. For every x in X ,
max
pi∈Π
pi · x = min
y∈Y
{ϕ (y) : x ≤ y}
and
min
pi∈Π
pi · x = max
y∈Y
{ϕ (y) : y ≤ x} .
Proof. We prove the first statement only, as the argument is specular for the other statement. We first
show that there exists y¯ in Y such that x ≤ y and
ϕ (y¯) = min
y∈Y
{ϕ (y) : x ≤ y} .
Observe that, for some sufficiently large λ > 0,
−λu ≤ x ≤ λu,
where u is the strictly positive claim in Y . Thus, by no arbitrage,
−λϕ (u) ≤ inf
y∈Y
{ϕ (y) : x ≤ y} ≤ λϕ (u) .
This shows that the infimum is finite. For every n in N, there exists a claim yn in {y ∈ Y : x ≤ y} such
that
ϕ (yn) ≤ inf
y∈Y
{ϕ (y) : x ≤ y}+ 1
n
.
If the sequence (yn)n∈N is bounded, then the claim follows. Otherwise, observe that yˆ
n = yn/ ‖yn‖ is
also a tradable claim in Y satisfying
x
‖yn‖ ≤ yˆ
n
and
ϕ (yˆn) ≤ infy∈Y {ϕ (y) : x ≤ y}‖yn‖ +
1
n ‖yn‖ .
Taking a subsequence of (yˆn)n∈N in Y converging to yˆ in Y , we obtain that yˆ > 0 and ϕ (yˆ) ≤ 0,
contradicting no arbitrage.
Clearly, pi · (x− y¯) ≤ 0 for every pi in Π. To prove that the opposite inequality is satisfied by some pi
in Π, consider the convex set C in R×X defined by
{(ϕ (y¯ − y) , y − x) ∈ R×X : y ∈ Y } .
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This set does not intersect R+ × X++. Hence, by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem, there exists a
non-null (µ, pi) in R+ ×X+ such that, for every y in Y ,
µϕ (y¯ − y) ≤ pi · (x− y) .
It can be verified that µ > 0 and, hence, µ = 1 at no loss of generality. Also,
0 ≤ ϕ (y¯ − y¯) ≤ pi · (x− y¯) ≤ 0,
thus proving that pi · (x− y¯) = 0. Finally, notice that, when y lies in Y , also (y¯ − y) is in Y . It follows
that
ϕ (y) ≤ ϕ (y¯ − (y¯ − y)) ≤ pi · (x− (y¯ − y)) ≤ pi · y.
As Y is a linear space, it is also true that ϕ (−y) ≤ pi · (−y). We conclude that, for every y in Y ,
ϕ (y) = pi · y,
which reveals that pi is an element of Π. 
APPENDIX B. CONTINUOUS (SUB-LINEAR) PRICING
This is a rather technical appendix which clarifies under which conditions uniformly high implied
interest rates fail when high implied interest rates are instead satisfied. To this purpose, consider the
linear space
L (e) = {x ∈ L : |x| ≤ λe for some λ > 0} ,
which is a Banach lattice when endowed with the norm ‖x‖ = inf {λ > 0 : |x| ≤ λe}. As usual, let
L∗ (e) be its norm dual. Notice that, by Alaoglu’s Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1999), Theorem
6.21), the closed unit ball in L∗ (e) is weak-∗ compact.
Under high implied interest rates, the space of (normalized) state prices P0 =
{
p ∈ P : p (s0) = 1}
can be regarded as a set in the positive cone of L∗ (e), where the duality operation is given by
p (x) =
∑
st∈S
p
(
st
)
x
(
st
)
.
Notice that, in general, the set P0 is not weak-∗ closed in L∗ (e), though, by Alaoglu’s Theorem, it is
contained in a weak-∗ compact set.
We can now provide a full characterisation of uniformly high implied interest rates. The violation of
uniformly high implied interest rates occurs if and only if some price in the closure of admissible prices
contains a bubble, that is, a non-negligible value at infinity. Under complete markets, such a circumstance
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is ruled out by assumption, as prices are supposed to have a sequential representation. When markets are
incomplete, a non-sequential price, as the limit of admissible prices, cannot be ruled out, unless some
uniformity of evaluation is imposed on the pricing kernel.
Proposition B.1 (Value at infinity). Under high implied interest rates, the condition of uniformly high
implied interest rates is satisfied if and only if, for every p in the weak-∗ closure of P0 in L∗ (e),
lim
t∈T
p
(
et
)
= p (e) ,
where et in L is the truncation of e in L at date t in T.
Proof. For necessity, suppose that the equivalent condition is violated. By positivity, this means that
there exists  > 0 such that, for some p∗ in the weak-∗ closure of P0, at every t in T,
p∗
(
e− et) = p∗ (e)− p∗ (et) > .
As p∗ lies in the weak-∗ closure of P0, for every t in T, it can be approximated by some p in P0 such that
p
(
e− et) > .
Thus, for every t in T,
sup
p∈P0
p
(
e− et) > ,
which contradicts the fact that condition (H) is satisfied.
For sufficiency, suppose that the equivalent condition is satisfied and assume a violation of uniformly
high implied interest rates. By monotonicity, this implies that there exists  > 0 such that, for every t in
T,
sup
p∈P0
p
(
e− et) ≥ .
At every t in T, consider the restricted set
P¯0,t =
({
p ∈ P¯0 : p
(
e− et) ≥ }) ,
where P¯0 is the weak-∗ closure of P0 in the positive cone of L∗ (e). Observe that P¯0,t is a non-empty
closed subset of the compact set P¯0 and that, by monotonicity, P¯0,t+1 ⊂ P¯0,t. By the Finite Intersection
Property, as P¯0 is compact,
p∗ ∈
⋂
t∈T
P¯0,t ⊂ P¯0.
For such an element p∗ of P¯0, p∗ (e) ≥ p∗
(
et
)
+  for every t in T, thus delivering a contradiction. 
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Example B.1. As a complement to the previous characterisation, we provide an example in which con-
dition (F) is satisfied and condition (H) is violated. The Markov states are S =
{
(lt)t∈T , (ht)t∈T
}
, with
l0 being the initial state and each ht being an absorbing state. In period t in T, when the economy is in
state lt, with equal probability, it will move to the absorbing state ht+1 or to state lt+1. The endowment
is e = (1− β) in state lt and e = β−t (1− β) in state ht. The only asset is an uncontingent bond,
delivering a unitary payoff, with constant price 1 > β > 0.
To verify that condition (F) holds true, notice the most optimistic evaluation of the endowment satisfies
the recursive equation
Q (lt) = (1− β) + sup
(pil,pih)∈R+×R+
pilQ (lt+1) + pihQ (ht+1)
subject to
pil + pih = β.
Furthermore, by direct computation, Q (ht) = β−t. It also immediate to prove that this recursive equa-
tion is solved by
Q (lt) = 1 + β
−t.
We now shall argue that condition (H) is instead violated.
For fixed non-initial t in T, consider the feasible sequence of Markov states (l0, . . . , lt−1, ht, ht, . . .)
in S. Let D be the path of date-events in S corresponding to the selected sequence of Markov states
and construct a price p in the closure of P by means of p
(
stˆ
)
= β tˆ, if stˆ lies in D, and p
(
stˆ
)
= 0,
otherwise. For such a price p in P , direct computation shows that
1
p (s0)
∑
st∈St
∑
st+r∈S(st)
p
(
st+r
)
e
(
st+r
)
=
∑
r∈T
βt+rβ−t (1− β) = 1.
Thus, the residual does not vanish, which shows that condition (H) cannot be satisfied.
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